North Korea- China- USA

The North Korean Regime Remains a Threat 

Cinthya Prevost

Professor: Brian Fonseca

Florida International University

Executive Summary

Relations among the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, People’s Republic of China and the US have been complicated for half a century. Currently, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has resulted in tension between both the US and China. Although the DPRK maintains a friendly relationship with China, North Korea’s hostile rhetoric threatens China’s grand strategy. Therefore, it is unlikely that China will support North Korea in in the event of a full-on military conflict.

In the mid-2000s, North Korea and China shifted rhetoric. 

• North Korea’s regime change affected the government’s engagement with its nuclear weapons program, changing the dynamic of the conflict. 

• North Korea pursuits an aggressive a nuclear weapons program to gain legitimacy and maintain the survival of its government.

• China wants a more prominent place in the international system to serve its national interest; therefore, Beijing is engaging in a rebranding effort to reshape its image.

• Beijing is portraying themselves as a peaceful power to avoid conflict with the US, and gain the cooperation of other states, while pursuing legitimacy as a world power.

Furthermore, the current preliminary negotiations between North Korea and the US are unlikely to produce significant changes if Kim Jong Un is unable to maintain power.

Introduction

North Korea remains a threat due to its commitment to a nuclear weapons program. Although Kim Jong Un has engaged President Trump in preliminary talks, these negotiations would are not likely to produce a productive solution to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. However, the DPRK’s friendly relations with the People’s Republic of China can be utilized to influence the regime to open to new ways of governance.

Background

Three key points highlight the onset of North Korea's relation with China: the 1950s Korean War, 1961 military alliance, shared socialist ideology, and economic collaboration.

Diplomatic relations between the DPRK and China began in the early 1950s during the Korean War. The Chinese government under communist leader Mao Zedong entered the war to assist communist North Korean regime with manpower, and economic assistance to fight off the Pro-American forces including South Korea. The Korean War officially ended in 1953 when the Armistice was signed, ending the war in a stalemate. No side was victorious, and technically North Korea remains at war with South Korea.

Both governments forged their partnership through the 1961 military alliance known as the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The treaty dictates that China and North Korea will provide military and economic aid if another state ever attacks either of them. However, North Korea and China cannot initiate the attack.

Over the years because of their shared socialist ideology, China and North Korea’s relations grew stronger through their economic partnership. Currently, China is North Korea’s primary trading partner and provides significant amount of food and energy.

Methodology

A historical analysis of the relations between the North Korea, China, and the US from the 1950s to 2000s was conducted by examining the preeminent literature found within available academic articles, books, newspaper, and government documents.

Structured analytic techniques were implemented to evaluate the underlying assumptions and judgments of the research through a combination of the Brainstorming and Key Assumptions Check technique.

North Korea’s Increased Antagonism

The succession of power from Kim Jong IL after his death to Kim Jong Un has resulted in a more hostile, aggressive and uncontrollable government.

• Under the leadership of Kim Jong IL, the DPRK withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), developed the country’s nuclear weapons program, and conducted the first atomic test with an explosive radius of 1 kiloton in 2006.

• Kim Jong Un has aggressively built up the country's nuclear arsenals in hopes of ensuring his regime survives. By 2013, the third nuclear test is performed with an estimated explosive radius of six to seven kilotons.

2016 was an intense year for North Korea-US relations because Kim Jong Un intensified his government’s antagonistic remarks by expressing opposition towards the US and South Korea to challenge the current leadership in both states.

• Two nuclear tests were conducted: one with an alleged hydrogen bomb and the ‘‘last test [so far] which was in September 2016 had an explosive estimated yield of between 10 and 30 kilotons’’ (Council on Foreign Relations).  

• The DPRK proved their government’s long-term goal it's to develop long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles with a miniaturized nuclear weapon that can reach the US.

As a response, the US increased its military presence in the Korean demilitarized zone to protect its ally South Korea. The U.S. also deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) which Pyongyang perceived as escalating the conflict.

China’s Interest in DPRK

China has historically continued to be close allies with North Korea because of their shared interest as states in the North-East Asian region of the world. However, Beijing will not intervene in favor of North Korea in a direct confrontation with the US. Even so would not directly support the US military efforts in the region to curtail US presence in the area.

Beijing is deeply involved in the North Korean situation for three main reasons: North Korea acts as a buffer state, the potential for a growing refugee crisis, and the North Korean nuclear program which the U.S. views as a threat.

According to Nanto and Manyin (2010), Beijing hopes to maintain the Pyongyang regime in place because it acts as a buffer state between Pro-American South Korea along and the United States military forces stationed in the area. The Chinese government prefers a divided Korean Peninsula to deter the US from reaching its borders, and because the thought of unification disrupts Beijing’s grand strategy. China’s ambition is to rise as a compelling power in the international system gradually. Nevertheless, China would also prefer to see the development of a more modern, authoritarian state in North Korea (Snow, 2013).

Beijing continues to be concerned about a possible massive refugee crisis if chaos were to erupt in the Korean Peninsula because thousands of Korean immigrants will flee to China. The massive numbers of North Korean refugees would disrupt the Chinese economy, decrease their development goals and hopes of establishing regional hegemony.

China appears unwilling to provide for the needs of the refugee because that would divert resources away from its population. According to Phil Robertson (2017), “China regularly violates the 1951 UN Refugee Convention treaty by categorizing North Korean refugees as illegal economic immigrants and forcibly returns these refugees to North Korea”.

Beijing continues its economic partnership and trade relations with North Korea to increase the standard of living and prevent people from leaving the country. At the same time, Beijing has not completely embraced economic sanctions against North Korea to prevent instability in the state.  ‘‘In the first half of 2017, China-North Korea trade totaled $ 2.6 billion, up 10 percent from the same period in 2016’’ (Albert, 2017).

The graph below depicts the increasing bilateral trade between China and North Korea.

Beijing’s Emerges in the  World  Community

In the mid-2000s after China’s economic growth took off, and Beijing began to actively participate in international organizations such as the World Trade Organizations, China modified its goals. China’s status as a world player changed, it is a more open socialist state that participates in the global market, embraces foreign capitalist companies, and pursuit’s financial investments in foreign countries. China is currently engaging in a rebranding effort to avoid confrontation with the U.S. and to gain international legitimacy.

China’s rise continues to be a peaceful transition to avoid alerting the US to take actions against Beijing.

• China currently is not prepared to fight in a conventional war with the U.S. since China only began to boost military capabilities in the early 200s. According to Roger Cliff, China's military was old-fashioned and outdated because the state focused on expanding the country’s economic sector.

• Records show that each year Beijing’s defense budget increases, making it the second-largest military budget.

• According to Joseph Nye (2015) China is still in the earliest stages of its constructions of a blue water navy that can operate across the open ocean, has a limited number of intercontinental missiles, and lacks alliances with other countries in the area.

Beijing desires a more significant position in the global system to shape policy outcomes and enhance their geostrategic position in the North-East Asia Region.

• China has been increasingly expanding its soft power to gain the cooperation of the other states in the region through the promotion of its history, culture, and language.

• At the same time, Beijing has been hesitant to openly support North Korea because the Kim regime's hostile rhetoric might eventually delegitimize Beijing's leadership rebranding efforts.

Outlook for North Korea’s Nuclear Program

In the last weeks after the Winter Olympics, the Kim regime has made several promises which should be judged with skepticism. Pyongyang is unlikely to stop its nuclear ambition because Kim Jong UN relies on the program's existence for survival. There is historical precedent for this kind of action in part of North Korea. According to Christopher Hill (2013) in 1994 North Korea leader Kim Jong IL and US President Bill signed the Agreed Framework to prevent the DPRK from constructing nuclear reactors in exchange for two light/water nuclear power plants, but Pyongyang develop nuclear weapons.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in will continue to establish communication with Kim Jong UN to improve relations between the two governments. President Moon is willing to provide resources to North Korea because he stated that previous talks hosted by the Sunshine Policy produced significant changes and the South Korean population supports these decisions.  According to Adam Taylor (2017), “a recent poll found that nearly 76.9 percent of South Koreans favored a return to inter-Korean dialogue’’.

For its part, China will continue to maintain steady relations with both North Korea and the US to gradually rises as a compelling power. China has been very cautious in the manner it engages North Korea in dialogue because Beijing’s goal is to maintain stability in the region and decrease US presence. Thus, China is unlikely to support the Pyongyang regime in the event that these renewed negotiations between the US and North Korea fail.

References

Albert, E. (2017). Understanding the China-North Korea relationship. Council on foreign relations.  

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship>

 Council on Foreign Relations. (2017). North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program. Podcast.

Hass, Richard. (2017) ‘‘World In Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order’’. S.l.: Penguin Press, Print. Chapter 3: The Other Order, Chapter 5: A Global Gap

Hill, C. R. (2013). The Elusive Vision of a Non-nuclear North Korea. Washington Quarterly, 36(2), 7-19.

Nanto, Dick K. and Mark E. Manyin. (2010, December 8). China-North Korea Relations. Congressional Research Service Report, 7-5700.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf>

Snow, Donald M. (2013). Cases in American Foreign Policy. Boston: Pearson, Print. Chapter 2: China: coping with dynamic Adversary Turned Ambiguous Partner, Chapter 4: North Korea: Balancing Recognition and the Nuclear Card.

Nye, Joseph S. (2015). Is the American Century Over?

Robertson, Phil. (2017) North Korean Refugees Trapped by China's Expanding Dragnet.

Human Rights Watch.

<www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/18/north-korean-refugees-trapped-chinas-expanding-dragnet. >

Taylor, Adam. (2017) ‘‘There are 3 big reasons South Korea’s new president wants talks with North Korea’’. The Washington Post.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/17/there-are-3-big-reasons-south-koreas-new-president-wants-talks-with-north-korea/?utm_term=.80301830a43b>

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